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Summary
The short article discusses the competences of ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland in re-
lation to the judiciary. These institutions have controlling and supervisory powers in re-
lation to courts of law, including the determination of the accountability of judges and 
typical competences of a prosecutor. The Author points out the necessity to read provi-
sions of the constitutions and acts regulating the discussed competences in the light of 
the principle of the judiciary’s independence. Still, the supervisory rights of ombudsmen 
in Sweden and Finland are very well developed and may refer to issues approaching close-
ly the sphere of jurisdiction. When assessing the solutions presented, the Author points 
out the fact that the ombudsmen in both countries have worked out respective practices 
aimed at such use of available means of control so they cannot be accused of a reason-
able and too extended interference with the judiciary sphere.
1 The Author is an Associate Professor in the Chair of Comparative Constitutional Law 
of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. E-mail: 
p.mikuli@uj.edu.pl.
2 This paper builds upon a research project financed by the National Science Centre, 
Poland, according to the decision DEC-2013/09/B/HS5/01185.
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Streszczenie
Instytucja Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich 
i sądownictwo w Szwecji i Finlandii
W artykule omówione zostały kompetencje ombudsmanów w Szwecji i Finlandii w od-
niesieniu do władzy sądowniczej. Instytucje te posiadają pewne uprawnienia kontrol-
no-nadzorcze nad sądami, w tym również w zakresie pociągania sędziów do odpowied-
zialności a także kompetencje typowo prokuratorskie. Autor wskazuje na konieczność 
odczytywania przepisów konstytucji i ustaw regulujących opisywane kompetencje w świ-
etle zasad niezależności władzy sądowniczej. Niemniej uprawnienia nadzorcze om-
budsmanów w Szwecji i Finlandii mają charakter rozbudowany i mogą dotyczyć kwest-
ii bardzo zbliżonych do sfery orzekania. Oceniając przedstawiane rozwiązania, Autor 
zwraca uwagę, że w obydwu państwach ombudsmani wypracowali odpowiednią prak-
tykę prowadzącą do takiego stosowania dostępnych im środków kontroli, aby nie narażać 
się na zarzut nieuzasadnionej i zbytnio rozszerzonej ingerencji w sferę aparatu sądowego.
*
I.
Nowadays, the offi ce of ombudsman is a typical body in the majority of dem-
ocratic states. The purpose of this office is mainly to control the activities of 
the executive, including mainly public authorities. The main feature of this 
public institution is a certain level of its independence from other powers. 
An essential feature of ombudsmen is their broad availability for every com-
plaining person and in principle to provide assistance to them free of charge. 
The origin of the institution of the ombudsman is generally known. It was es-
tablished in Sweden already in 1809, and in Finland 110 years later, in 1919. 
Only after the Second World War did the institution of the ombudsman be-
came widely known in Europe and all over the world. The solutions applied 
in contemporary countries are very often of a heterogeneous nature and, 
even if they have been based directly on the Scandinavian model, it is rather 
its Danish version. Therefore, it would be worth analysing the institutions of 
the ombudsman in Sweden and Finland. In these two counties the ombuds-
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man has the power to control the judiciary and prosecutor’s rights, including 
the right to discipline civil servants. In the other Nordic countries such com-
petences in relation to courts of law have been explicitly excluded3. The om-
budsmen in Denmark, Norway and Iceland have never adopted a disciplinary 
function in relation to civil servants, but have focused on the verification of 
administrative decisions in respect to their formal aspects and their contents4.
To explain the possibility of controlling the judicial authorities in the two 
abovementioned states, the genesis of the institution of ombudsman in a mo-
narchic state, where the principles of division of power or organisational sep-
aration of the judiciary were not developed, should be pointed out. It should 
be realised that the execution of justice originates here from the prerogatives 
of a monarch as a holder of the sovereign power. The submission of judicial 
authorities to an ombudsman’s control could be perceived as an element de-
mocratising a political system, in particular because the ombudsman is a body 
created by the parliament. Nowadays in the legal culture of Sweden and Fin-
land the control powers of the ombudsman in respect to the judiciary are not 
perceived as an infringement of the judiciary’s independence.
II.
In the Nordic countries the general ombudsman, although independent from 
the government, do not have total freedom to act but fulfil their obligations 
under authorisation and in a way on behalf of the Parliament. In all those 
countries the general ombudsman is elected by the Parliaments. Here it should 
be mentioned that the Swedish solution is unique, since there are four parlia-
mentary ombudsmen and one of these is appointed as the Chief Parliamen-
tary Ombudsman. In Sweden and Finland, which are interesting from the 
perspective of this paper, the holders of the office of ombudsman are recruit-
3 See Sec. 7 § 2, Parliamentary Ombudsman Act of 1996 (Denmark), Art. 3 Parliamen-
tary Ombudsman Act of 1997 (Iceland) and sec. 3 Law on Parliamentary Ombudsman for 
Administration of 1963 (Norway).
4 B. Kucia and P. Mikuli, Źródło inspiracji instytucji ombudsmana – rozwiązania skan-
dynawskie, [in:] Instytucje ombudsmana w państwach anglosaskich. Studium porównawcze, 
Warszawa 2017, p. 63.
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ed among persons possessing great legal expertise and enjoying general re-
spect. Still, the formal requirements differ in this respect. In Sweden the law 
does not define any criteria, and the appointees to this position are habitual-
ly distinguished lawyers, including judges of the Supreme Court5. The only 
requirement in Finland is that a candidate must possess ‘distinguished legal 
expertise’ (sec. 38 item 1 of the Constitution). In Sweden the incompatibilta-
tis principle does not result from legal provisions, but is established as a re-
sult of the systemic practice. While in Finland according to sec. 17 item 1 of 
the Act with Instructions for Parliamentary Ombudsmen of 2002, the om-
budsman and their deputies are prohibited from holding any public office, 
and from undertaking any activities in the public or private sectors, which 
could undermine the credibility or impartiality of the ombudsmen or their 
deputies, or impede the fulfilment of their obligations.
III.
The scope of competence of the ombudsman in relation to judicial bodies is 
the resultant of the interpretation of the constitutional provisions on the gen-
eral rights of such bodies and the provisions guaranteeing independence of 
the judiciary6. According to G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, the provisions referring 
to the ombudsman in Finland and Sweden enable interference with the con-
tents of court awards, and only the constitutional practice has led to absten-
tion from such activities. In my opinion, this stance should be rejected since 
it seems to neglect the need of interpretation of such provisions in the con-
text of the constitutional rules that guarantee the independence of the judi-
ciary in both countries.
In Sweden sec. 6 chapter 13 of the Instrument of Government entitles the 
ombudsman for instance to review court documents and reports, and courts 
of law are obliged to provide the ombudsman, like in case of other controlled 
5 J. Stern, Sweden, [in:] European Ombudsman – Institutions: A comparative legal analysis 
regarding the multifaceted realisation of an idea, ed. G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Wien 2008, p. 412 
and the literature quoted there.
6 See G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, The Legal Structures of Ombudsman – Institutions in Europe – 
Legal Comparative Analysis, [in:] European Ombudsman – Institutions..., p. 26.
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bodies, with information and explanations, which are requested from them. 
The interpretation of the constitutional provisions requires that § 3 chap-
ter the Instrument of Government of 1974 be taken into account, accord-
ing to which no. public authority, including the Riksdag, may decide on the 
contents of court awards and the manner in which the law is applied in indi-
vidual cases. The Instrument of Government of 1974 in sec. 8 of chapter XI 
grants the rights to ombudsmen to file petitions to the Supreme Court con-
cerning crimes committed during the fulfilment of the obligation of a judge 
of the Supreme Court, to the Supreme Administrative Court, and to apply for 
the exclusion of judges of those courts from adjudicating panels, their sus-
pension or to file petitions for their medical examinations. In the case of the 
courts of the highest instances, ombudsmen perform the function of a dis-
ciplinary prosecutor.
Swedish ombudsmen also have the rights of prosecutors. They can initiate 
specific court proceedings from a position of an extraordinary prosecutor in 
relation to every public officer (including a judge) who does not fulfil their re-
sponsibilities or have committed a crime in the field of their authority, how-
ever it shall not refer to crimes against the Act on Freedom of the Press and 
against the Act on Freedom of Speech7. In respect to a preliminary investi-
gation, the ombudsman has the same rights as a prosecutor. Moreover, per-
taining to Art. 6 clause 3 of the Act with the Instructions for Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen, “if proceedings can be taken by means of disciplinary mea-
sures against an official who, in disregarding the obligations of his office or 
his mandate, has committed an error, an Ombudsman may report the mat-
ter to those empowered to decide on such measures”.
The ombudsman may notify a competent authority on a suspicion of an 
act committed by an official, which is subject to disciplinary liability. More-
over, ombudsmen have been granted competences to demand the initiation 
of proceedings aimed at dismissal of a public official from an office or their 
temporary suspension, if they commit a crime or serious reoccurring fault. 
In this respect they can also, for instance, conduct their own supplementary 
procedure and present their own opinions on proceedings conducted by an-
7 Sec 6, chapter 13 of the Instrument of Government of 1974 and sec. 6 of the Act with 
the Instructions for Parliamentary Ombudsmen.
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other body. They are also entitled to apply to courts of law for the change of 
a decision made by a competent body on disciplinary issues.
The Instrument of Government of 1974 provides ombudsmen also with the 
right to review the documents and minutes of courts of law, while the courts 
are obliged to disclose such information and provide explanations.
IV.
The rights of the Finnish ombudsman in relation to courts of law result from 
the general characteristics of their obligations, as presented in sec. 109 of the 
Constitution. Courts of law are listed there as one of the categories of authori-
ties and persons, who perform public functions and are to be supervised by the 
ombudsman in respect to their compliance with the law and fulfilment of ob-
ligations. This regulation must be interpreted in relation to the provisions on 
independence of the courts of law. According to Art. 3 of the Constitution, 
‘the judiciary’s power is executed by independent courts of law, with last in-
stance formed by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court’. 
Undoubtedly it means restrictions in the ombudsman’s interference with the 
contents of court judgements.
Section 110 of the Constitution grants the right to the ombudsman to file 
a charge against a judge who has violated legal provisions when they perform 
their function. As compared to Sweden, the specific impact of the ombuds-
man on the judiciary is less regulated on the level of ordinary legislation in 
Finland. In general, the Act repeats the constitutional regulation in this re-
spect8. Still, the right to control, that is to enter courts of law and their IT sys-
tems9 and the right to demand information connected with the right to ‘a con-
fidential conversation’ with employees of the judiciary10 could be derived from 
other provisions of the Act, which refers to public bodies supervised by the 
ombudsman. Obviously, these rights are very wide and undoubtedly they in-
terfere significantly with the sphere of operation of the judiciary, as least as 
perceived by an external observer.
8 Sec. 1 § 1, Parliamentary Ombudsman Act of 2002.
9 Sec. 6, ibidem.
10 Sec 7, ibidem.
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The Finnish ombudsman has the right to demand an investigation to be 
initiated by the police and preliminary proceedings “in order to explain an 
issue examined by the ombudsman”11. As in the case of their Swedish coun-
terpart, the Finnish ombudsman also has a prosecutor’s rights. This results 
directly from sec. 110 sentence 2 of the Constitution, according to which the 
ombudsman ‘may prosecute or decide on filing of charges’ in cases subject 
to their scope of supervision of legal compliance.
V.
The ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland are included in the execution of a type 
of specific supervision of courts of law and also have certain rights to deter-
mine the accountability of judges as well as certain typical rights of a prose-
cutor. Thus, the competences of the ombudsmen discussed here are included 
in the solution regulating proceedings in the regime aimed at the examina-
tion of complaints about the operations of courts and activities undertaken 
by judges (outside the normal mode of appeal against judgments within the 
normal mode of a given instance). In the model used in Sweden and in Den-
mark, competences of such a type are granted to an external institution placed 
outside the structure of the judiciary’s power12.
It should be added that the ombudsmen’s supervision of the courts in Swe-
den and Finland is well developed and ombudsmen’s rights refer also to the 
issues that are directly related to the sphere of the judiciary13. Although they 
do not have a possibility to directly modify court awards, the activities of the 
ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland may refer directly to sensitive issues re-
lated, for instance, to the examination of the legality of specific court awards. 
This may be concluded, for instance, from the analysis of annual reports pre-
pared by both institutions of the ombudsman. In some situations the ombuds-
11 Sec. 8, ibidem.
12 See P. Mikuli, Skargi na działalność sądów: kilka uwag o polskich rozwiązaniach na tle 
porównawczym, [in:] Zagadnienia prawa konstytucyjnego. Polskie i zagraniczne rozwiązania 
ustrojowe, Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Dariuszowi Góreckiemu w siedemdzie-
siątą rocznicę urodzin, eds K. Skotnicki, K. Składkowski, A. Michalak, Łódż 2016, pp. 299 ff.
13 See B. Kucia and P. Mikuli, op.cit., p. 54.
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man sometimes points out directly the fact that there are no. legal grounds 
for a specific court award14.
D.C. Rowat points out a few factors that may be treated as arguments for 
the ombudsman’s supervision of courts of law15. First, such supervision exer-
cised by an external body makes it possible to avoid a charge that is frequent-
ly brought in many countries, that judges protect their own interests. At the 
same time, in the system of the countries discussed, ombudsmen are lawyers, 
and in the case of Sweden, judges, who are well aware of complicated court 
procedures. Second, the ombudsman may not undermine the independence 
of courts of law, since they have no. power to change or cancel a court ruling. 
Third, the ombudsman controls only procedural issues, but not the contents 
of a specific court ruling. Fourth, after the completion of controlling activ-
ities, the ombudsman usually reprimands judges or expresses their critical 
opinion on a specific issue, but hardly every uses the right to submit a charge.
D.C. Rowat points out that, in practice, the ombudsman’s activities con-
cerning the judiciary’s power are hardly ever criticised due to the limited num-
ber of the ombudsman’s interventions in this respect16. The ombudsman’s re-
marks refer rather to the administrative staff of justice in the broad meaning 
of the word (policemen, prison officials).
The advantages of such supervision are also discussed for instance by L. Lind-
ström, one of the current Swedish parliamentary ombudsmen17. He states that 
every power must be subject to control, in particular courts of law, whose 
competences are very wide in relation to citizens. At the same time, L. Lind-
ström explicitly underlines a need to guarantee the independence of the judi-
ciary’s power during the performance of control activities. For him, it is also 
14 See cases no. 5904–2012 and no. 6163–2012 quoted in the Swedish ombudsmen’s 
report for the period from 1.07.2013 to 30.06.2014, http://www.jo.se/Global/%C3%84m-
betsber%C3%A4ttelser/2014–15_eng.pdf (10.11.2017).
15 D.C. Rowat, Why an Ombudsman to Supervise the Courts? [in:] The International Om-
budsman Anthology, ed. L.C. Reif, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 531. See B. Kucia and 
P. Mikuli, op.cit., p. 55.
16 D.C. Rowat, op.cit., p. 530.
17 L. Lindström, Supervision of the Courts by the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen, TAIEX 
multi-country seminar, Stockholm, 12 September 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
taiex/dyn/create_speech.jsp?speechID=25633&key=8694d04ff5ce8ad1bbfea1f2df9bb2f3 
(10.11.2017). See as well B. Kucia and P. Mikuli, op.cit., p. 55.
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essential in the context of the international standards of access to indepen-
dent courts of law (Art. 6 of ECHR). L. Lindström’s opinions are convergent 
with the stance of C. Eklundh, who held the position of the chief Swedish om-
budsman in the years 1987–2003. He writes: “A system of the Swedish type 
giving the ombudsman the right to supervise the courts has in fact proved 
to have several important advantages compared with the systems existing in 
other countries. First of all it is easy for anybody – e.g. a party or a witness – 
who feels that he has been incorrectly treated by a judge or a court to com-
plain to the ombudsman. Secondly the ombudsman can start an investigation 
even if there is no. reason to believe that the error that has been committed is 
of such a serious nature as to give rise to disciplinary proceedings, to a pros-
ecution or to a decision to remove the judge from office. Thirdly, since the 
ombudsman can look also into minor matters he can make such statements 
concerning good judicial behaviour and the proper way of applying proce-
dural rules that cannot be made e.g. by a superior court after an appeal. Last 
but not least, since the ombudsman is independent in the same way as a judge 
there can be no. grounds for suspicions that the ombudsman’s interventions 
has any other purpose than to protect the citizens and to promote the prin-
ciple of the rule of law“18.
C. Eklundh and L. Lindström emphasise that exceptional prudence must 
be ensured in cases related to the supervision of courts of law. It is an essen-
tial requirement in this respect, that the ombudsman is an expert in court 
proceedings, since even a minor error may not occur here. C. Eklundh also 
points out that the majority of Swedish ombudsmen were earlier judges and 
many of them were judges of the Supreme Court upon their appointment 
to the position of ombudsman. He also states that the activities of the Swedish 
ombudsman contribute significantly to the explanation of procedural proce-
dures19 and development of professional ethics in courts of law, while the right 
to submit complaints concerning judges has a very important social function. 
Moreover, Eklundh underlines that, thanks to the ombudsman, citizens are 
18 C. Eklundh, Supervision of the Courts by the Ombudsman, http://www.varuh-rs.si/
fileadmin/user_upload/word/Mednarodna_porocila/Relationship_between_Ombuds-
men_and_ Judicial_Bodies/Svedska_-_zadnja_verzija_.doc, p. 3 (10.11.2017).
19 See I. al-Wahab, The Swedish Institution of Ombudsman: An Instrument of Human Rights, 
Stockholm 1979, p. 76.
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sure that they are protected by an impartial and highly qualified institution 
against abuse that may occur in the judiciary20.
When considering the above documents one should remember that the 
legal culture has significant meaning for the assessment of an ombudsman’s 
competences in relation to the judiciary. In both countries, the ombudsmen 
have worked out respective practices, in which they use the available means 
of control in such a way that they are not accused of unreasonable and too 
wide interference with the judicial institutions.
Although the activities of the ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland in re-
lation to the judiciary’s power have not aroused too many controversies, one 
should ask about the extent of interference with the judicial sphere that may 
be allowed from the point of view of the international standards concerning 
independence of the judiciary21. G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer points out in this 
context the opinions expressed by the Venice Commission22. Allowed ex-
ceptions refer in fact to interference with the administrative sphere of the 
judiciary. A reference is made to certain procedural issues, such as setting 
the dates of court hearings, obtaining opinions of expert witnesses, submit-
ting copies of court rulings, enforcing rulings and undertaking measures in 
disciplinary cases related to judges. It seems controversial to qualify such an 
issue as a separate item from court rulings and in another regime it could 
undermine the principle of independence of the judiciary. Thus, G. Kucs-
ko-Stadlmayer is right when noticing that: “Every possible interaction be-
tween ombudsmen and courts has to be carefully considered if it could 
involve a menace of this independence. Thus, the relation between the om-
budsmen and the courts will always stay a sensitive issue, located between 
the separation of powers and the necessity to systematically improve the ef-
fectiveness of human rights protection”23.
20 See C. Eklundh, op.cit., p. 8.
21 B. Kucia and P. Mikuli, op.cit., p. 56.
22 See G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Relations between Ombudsmen and the Courts: The viewpoint 
of the Venice Commission, Round Table with the Russian Commissioners for Human Rights 
22/23 November 2011, Samara Region. See B. Kucia and P. Mikuli, op.cit., p. 57.
23 Ibidem.
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VI.
To assess the mutual interactions between ombudsmen and the judiciary’s 
power in Sweden and Finland, one should take account of a quite obvious the-
sis that every systemic solution should refer to the legal and political culture 
of a given country24. The model of supervision of judges’ work, which is ob-
served in Sweden and Finland, may be in no. case be unquestioningly trans-
ferred to other constitutional systems. In a stabilised democracy, the guar-
antees of a strict legal nature are of smaller importance, because the political 
principles of operation in the public sphere are so developed that the phe-
nomena unwanted from the perspective of the rules of a democratic state of 
law hardly ever occur25. Sweden and Finland developed such manners of co-
operation of the ombudsmen and the judiciary, which in the practice of their 
regimes do not undermine the independence of judges26. Rather, it contrib-
utes to the actual elimination of attempts to use mechanisms enabling inter-
ference with the sphere of the judiciary’s power in order to achieve specific 
political purposes.
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